I. The Initial Idea

1. "Why, then, did Plato choose to write philosophy in this peculiar form? There is no straightforward answer to this question, not least because Plato never tells us in his own voice the reason(s) for anything he says or does. This in itself suggests that dialogue form is *intrinsic* to Plato's purposes in a way that it was not for later writers, from Aristotle to Hume, who composed dialogues but also treatises. Nor does Plato ever show us in the dialogues how to use the dialogues."

(Ruby Blondell *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* Cambridge 2002, 38, her emphasis)

II. Some Candidate Examples of Platonic Self-Commentary
A. Cross-References

Internal examples: Opening of *Republic* VIII cross-reference to end of *Republic* IV/start of V & elaborate resumption of material in between with proposal 'to recall the point where we turned aside, so as to travel the same route once more' (543c5-6: ἀναμνησθῶμεν πόθεν δεόρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἱώμεν.)

External examples: *Sophist* 217c refers to a conversation between an aging Parmenides and a youthful Socrates of kind depicted in *Parmenides*. *Philebus* 14d4 refers to certain one-many puzzles whose form and sequence closely recalls *Parmenides* 127d-130a as having been 'made public' (τὰ δεδημευμένα). *Sophist* 234b5-10 recalls and, Burnyeat argues, quietly corrects *Republic* X, 598b8-c4. (See M.F. Burnyeat *Culture and Society in Plato's Republic*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 20, 1999 ed. Grethes B Peterson (Salt Lake City 1999), 215-324 at 302).

B. Frame-Interruption in the *Euthydemus* (and compare, for example, *Phaedo* 102a)

2.1 *Euthydemus* 290a7-c8
Where should we turn next, then? I [Socrates] asked. To which one of the arts?
I find myself at a loss, he [Clinias] said.
But I think I have discovered it, said I.
Which one is it? said Clinias.
The art of generalship seems to me, I said, to be the one which, more than any other, a man would be happy if he acquired.
It doesn't seem so to me, he [Clinias] said.
How is that? said I.
Well, this art is a kind of man hunting.
What then? I said.
No art of actual hunting, he said, extends any further than pursuing and capturing: whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and the fisherman hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams they simply discover those which already exist), since they themselves have no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians—at least, those of them do who are not completely senseless.

Well done, I said, most handsome and clever Clinias! ... [Clinias goes on to draw the moral that generalship, as a kind of art of capture, that hands over its conquests to statesmen, cannot be the art that they seek.] [Translation of Rosamond Kent Sprague in Plato Complete Works ed. John M Cooper, Indianapolis 1997]

Ποῦ οὖν, ἔφην ἔγω, τραποίμεθαν ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίσιν τέχνην;
Ἑγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη.
'Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἔγω, ἐμὲ οἴμαι ἴηρηκέναι.
Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.
'Ἡ στρατηγικὴ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἔγω, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢν ἄν τις κητωδίμενος εὐδαίμων εἶη.
Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Πῶς; ἦν δ' ἔγω.
Θηρευτικὴ τις ἦδε γέ ἐστιν τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.
Τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἔγω.
Εἶδον, ἦν δ' ἔγω, ὡς κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία·

2.2 Euthydemus 290e1-291a7
CRITO: What do you mean, Socrates, did the boy utter all this?
SOCRATES: You’re not convinced of it, Crito?
CRITO: Good heavens no! Because, in my opinion, if he spoke like that he needs no education, either from Euthydemus or anyone else.
SOCRATES: Dear me, then perhaps after all it was Ctesippus who said this, and I am getting absent-minded.
CRITO: Not my idea of Ctesippus!
SOCRATES: But I'm sure of one thing at least, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said it. Do you suppose, my good Crito, that some superior being was there and uttered these things—because I am positive I heard them.

CRITO: Yes, by heaven, Socrates, I certainly think it was some superior being, very much so. ...

[Sprague]

{ΚΡ.} Τί λέγεις σύ, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐκείνο τὸ μειράκιον τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγξατο;
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκ σεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων;
{ΚΡ.} Μὰ Δί, οὐ μέντοι. οἴμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἑγώ, εἰ ταὐτ' εἶπεν, οὐτ' Ἐὐθυδήμου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἀνθρώπου δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.
{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Δίος, μή ὁ Κτήσιππος ἢν ο ταῦτ' εἰπών, ἑγώ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;
{ΚΡ.} Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;
{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε εὐ οἶδα, ὅτι οὐτε Ἐὐθυδήμου οὔτε Διονυσόδωρος ἢν ο εἶπὼν ταῦτα ἀλλ', ὥ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρών αὐτά ἐφθέγξατο; ὅτι γὰρ ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὐ οἶδα.
{ΚΡ.} Ναι μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε.

III. Finished work and questions & answers
3. Phaedrus 275d4-e5

SOCRATES: You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The offsprings of painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of written words. You'd think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you want to learn more [mathein: 'because you want to understand'], it continues to signify just that very same forever. When it has once been written down, every discourse rolls about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father's support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support. [Translation of Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Plato Complete Works, my [...]].

{ΣΩ.} Δεινὸν γὰρ ποῦ, ὥ Φαϊδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοίων ζωγραφίας. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκεῖνης ἐγκυνα έπεικε μὲν ὡς ζωντα, ἐὰν δὲ ἄνερη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγά. ταυτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι δόξας μὲν ἃς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τι έρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σεμαίνει μόνον ταυτὸν αὐτῷ. ὅταν δὲ άπαξ γραφή, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πάς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαύονσι, ὡς δὲ αὕτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἔπισταται λέγειν οίς δεῖ γε καὶ μή. πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη λοιδορθείς τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ δεῖται βοηθοῦ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθήσαι δυνατός αὐτῷ.
4. Protagoras 328e5-329b1

Now, you could hear a speech similar to this from Pericles or some other competent orator if you happened to be present when one of them was speaking on this subject. But try asking one of them something, and they will be as unable to answer your question or to ask one of their own as a book would be. Question the least little thing in their speeches and they will go on like bronze bowls that keep ringing for a long time after they have been struck and prolong the sound indefinitely unless you dampen them. That's how these orators are: Ask them one little question and they're off on another long-distance speech. [Translation of Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell in Plato Complete Works]

καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦτων συγγένειοι ὄντων τῶν δημηγόρων, τάξιν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἰκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέποιτο τινὰ τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὕτω ἀποκρίνασθαι οὕτω αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἄλλα ἕαν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερυθησθῆ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει ἔναν μή ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου.

5.1 Protagoras 339e1-5

At first I felt as if I had been hit by a good boxer. Everything went black and I was reeling from Protagoras' oratory and the others' clamor. Then, to tell you the truth, to stall for time to consider what the poet meant ... [Lombardo and Bell]

καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ὕπο ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἤλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἐπείτα – ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσδαι τάληθη, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τι λέγει ο ὁ ποιητής ... 

5.2 Protagoras 341e7-342a2

But I would like to tell you what I think Simonides' purpose is in this ode, if you would like to test my command (to use your term) of poetry. [Lombardo and Bell]

ἀλλʼ ἂ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τοῦτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὅ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπών·

5.3 Protagoras 347a3-5

And that, Prodicus and Protagoras, ... is what I think was going through Simonides' mind when he composed this ode.

tαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὥ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἢν δʼ ἐγὼ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ἄσμα.
6. Protagoras 345d3-5 (quoting Simonides)

All who do no wrong willingly
I praise and love.
Necessity not even the gods resist.
[Lombardo and Bell]

πάντας δ’ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται:

7. Protagoras 343b5–d6

It was in this context that the saying of Pittacus—*It is hard to be good*—was privately circulated with approval among the sages. Then Simonides, ambitious for philosophical fame, saw that if he could score a takedown against this saying, as if it were a famous wrestler, and get the better of it, he would himself become famous in his own lifetime. So he composed this poem as a deliberate attack against this maxim. That’s how it seems to me.

Let’s test my hypothesis together, to see whether what I say is true. If all the poet wanted to say was that it is hard to become good, then the beginning of the poem would be crazy, for he inserted there an antithetical particle [viz. *men*]. It doesn’t make any sense to insert this unless one supposes that Simonides is addressing the Pittacus maxim as an opponent. Pittacus says it is hard to be good. Simonides rebuts this by saying, ‘No, but it is hard for a man to become good, Pittacus, truly.’ [Lombardo and Bell]

καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἓδη περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ <χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐξεμεναίναι>. ὦ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἂτε φιλότιμος ὄν ἐπὶ σοφία, ἤγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ εὑδοκιμοῦντα ἄθλητην καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμησε ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις, εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τοῦτο Ξένα τοῦτω ἐπιβουλεύων κολούσαι αὐτὸ ἀπαντῶν τὸ ἀξίμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

Ἐπισκεψόμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινὴ ἀπαντεῖ, εἰ ἀρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἄρματος μανικόν ἄν φανεί, εἶ βουλόμονος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἐπεῖτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ <μέν>. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἔνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβληθαι, ἡν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ ἔριζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην· λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι <χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐξεμεναίναι>, ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὡδᾷ, ἀλλὰ <γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν> ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς...

8. Protagoras 347b3–348a6

Yes, Hippias, Alcibiades said, some other time, though. What should be done now is what Socrates and Protagoras agreed upon, which is for Socrates to answer any questions Protagoras may still have to ask, or if he so chooses, to answer Socrates’ questions.
Then I said, I leave it up to Protagoras, but if it's all right with him, why don't we say good-bye to odes and poetry and get back to what I first asked him, a question, Protagoras, which I would be glad to settle in a joint investigation with you. Discussing poetry strikes me as no different from the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd. These people, largely uneducated and unable to entertain themselves over their wine by using their own voices to generate conversation, pay premium prices for flute-girls and rely on the extraneous voice of the reed flute as background music for their parties. But when well-educated gentlemen drink together, you will not see girls playing the flute or the lyre or dancing, but a group that knows how to get together without these childish frivolities using their own voice, taking their turn at speaking and listening in the proper fashion no matter how heavily they are drinking. Ours is such a group, if indeed it consists of men such as most of us claim to be, and it should require no extraneous voices, not even of poets, who cannot be questioned on what they say. When a poet is brought up in a discussion, almost everyone has a different opinion about what he means, and they wind up arguing about something they can never finally decide. The best people avoid such discussions and rely on their own powers of speech to entertain themselves and set about testing and instructing each other in their discussions. These people should be our models. We should put the poets aside and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and our own ideas. [Lombardo and Bell, modified somewhat]
αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πείραν λαμβάνοντας

9.1 Phaedo 97b8-c3
One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind [nous, reason] that directs and is the cause of everything. [Translation of Grube in Plato Complete Works, my [...]]

'Αλλ' ἀκόουσα μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἄναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἔστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίος,

9.2 Phaedo 97c3-d1
I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be, or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. [Grube]

tαύτη δὴ τῇ αἴτιᾳ ἔσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινά εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τόν νοὸν εἶναι πάντων αἰτίων, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοὐθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοὸν κοιμοῦντα πάντα κοιμεῖν καὶ ἔκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπη ἢν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ εἰ ὁ δῆ τοῦ μακροῦτο πᾶν αἴτιαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ ἐννεὶ ἢ ἄλλο ὁ τινός πάντες ἢ ποιεῖν.

9.3 Phaedo 98b7-c2
This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and water and many other strange things. [Grube]

'Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἔλπιδος, ὥς ἔταΐρε, ὕψος ἡμῶν φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊῶν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὀρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ ὡσεὶ χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινὰς αἰτίας ἐπαίτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἄρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.

9.4 Phaedo 98c2-d6
That seemed to me much like saying that Socrates' actions are all due to his mind, and then in trying to tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason I am sitting here is because my body consists of bones and sinews, because the bones are hard and are separated by joints... [intervening additional description of Socrates' bodily mechanics enabling sitting] and that is the cause of my sitting here with my limbs. [Grube, my [...]
Is that what you're saying—or do I misunderstand? [Gill and Ryan]

οὔτω λέγεις, ἢ ἔγω οὕκ ὅρθως καταμαθάνω;

10.2 Parmenides 128a1

I would gladly become the disciple of any man who taught the workings of that kind of cause. [Grube]

ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητής ὅτου οὖν ἦδιστ' ἄν γενοίμην·

10.1 Parmenides 127d6–e10

Then [Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that] Socrates, after he had heard it, asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again; and when he had read it, Socrates said:

Zeno, what do you mean by this: if things are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, because unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike? That's what you say, isn't it?

It is, said Zeno.

If it is impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, isn't it then also impossible for them to be many? Because, if there were many, they would have incompatible properties [literally: they would suffer impossible things]. Is this the point of your arguments—simply to maintain, in opposition to everything that is commonly said, that things are not many?

[Translation of Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan in Plato Complete Works, my [...]]

Τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούοντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρῶτου λόγου ἀναγνώσας, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, Πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι τὰ ὀντά, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοῖα τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἄδυνατον οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοῖα οὔτε τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνόμοια ὀνὸν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὔτω λέγεις;

Οὗτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄδυνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοῖα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνόμοια, ἄδυνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἶπ, πᾶσχοι ἂν τὰ ἄδυνατα. ἄρα τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἂν διαμάχησθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὔ πολλὰ ἔστι;
10.3 Parmenides 128a2-3
No, said Zeno, on the contrary, you grasp the general point of the book splendidly. [Gill and Ryan]
Οὐκ ἀλλὰ φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.

10.4 Parmenides 128a4-b6
Parmenides, Socrates said, I understand that Zeno wants to be on intimate terms with you not only in friendship but also in his book. He has, in a way, written the same thing as you, but by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in your poem that the all is one, and you give splendid and excellent proofs for that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and gives a vast array of very grand proofs of his own. So, with one of you saying 'one', and the other 'not many', and with each of you speaking in a way that suggests that you've said nothing the same—although you mean practically the same thing—what you've said you appear to have said over the heads of the rest of us. [Gill and Ryan]

Μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὅτι Ζήνων ὃς ὁ μῦνον τῇ ἀλλη σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὕκειος οὖν καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι ταῦταν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σοῦ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἐτερόν τι λέγων. σοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φης εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμηρία παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ ὃς ὃ δὲ αὕτος πολλὰ φησιν εἶναι, τεκμηρία δὲ καὶ αὐτός πάμπολλα καὶ παραμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ σοῦ τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλὰ, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὡστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτα, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται υἱὸν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρήσθαι.

10.5 Parmenides 128b7-e4
Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. Still, you haven't completely discerned the truth about my book, even though you chase down its arguments and follow their spoor as keenly as a young Spartan hound. First of all, you have missed this point: the book doesn't at all preen itself on having been written with the intent you described while disguising it from people, as if that were some great accomplishment. You have mentioned something that happened accidentally. The truth is that the book comes to the defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by claiming that, if it is one, many absurdities and self-contradictions result from that argument. Accordingly, my books speaks against those who assert the many and pays them back in kind with something for good measure, since it aims to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many, would, if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more absurd than those suffered by the hypothesis of its being one. In that competitive spirit, then, I wrote the book when I was a young man. Someone made an unauthorized copy, so I didn't even have a chance to decide for myself whether or not it should see the light. So in this respect you missed the point, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's competitiveness, but out of a mature man's vainglory. Still, as I said, your portrayal was not bad. [Gill and Ryan]
Ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ δὲ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἴσθησαι. καίτοι ὅπερ γε αἰ Lάκαιναι σκύλακες εὐ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἄλλα πρώτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνόνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὡστε ἄπερ σῦ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφήναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τὶ μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἄλλα σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα [τὰ γράμματα] τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἐν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοία συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἕναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἃν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλὰ ἐστίν, ἡ ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τὶς ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικιάν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τὶς αὐτὸ ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὡστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἰτ’ ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μὴ, ταῦτα οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃς οὕχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικιάς οἰεί αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἄλλ’ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ’ εἴπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπήκασας.